Psychoanalysis ushered in this century. Will its influence on developmental psychopathology end in the next? The paper explores some critical obstacles in the way of psychodynamic research, including the fragmentation of psychoanalytic theory, the relative independence of theory from its clinical and empirical base, the predominance of inductive scientific logic, the polymorphous use of terms, the privacy of clinical data, the dominance of the reconstructionist stance, and the isolation of psychoanalysis from psychology and neurobiology. Notwithstanding these limitations, core psychoanalytic precepts are not only consistent with some of the most important advances of the last decade but may also be helpful in elaborating these new discoveries in the next century. Psychoanalysis is centered on the notion that complex, conflicting, unconscious representations of mental states constitute a key facet of normal and abnormal development. This notion retains its power, and deserves a prominent position among the major frames of reference to guide developmental science in the next century.
The future of psychoanalysis, if it is to have a fu-logical support, that any body of knowledge ture, is in the context of an empirical psychology, built on Freud's dubious insights is likely to abetted by imaging techniques, neuro-anatomical disappear into quicksand, and that "despite methods, and human genetics. Embedded in the some well-intentioned efforts at reform a sciences of human cognition, the ideas of psycho-pseudoscience is what psychoanalysis has reanalysis can be tested, and it is here that these mained" (p. 55).
ideas can have their greatest impact. (Kandel, Attacks on Freud's corpus are by no means 1998, p. 468) new. John Watson (1930) predicted that "20 years from now an analyst using Freudian Few would question that psychoanalytic theconcepts and Freudian terminology will be ory, and particularly Freud's ideas, have explaced on the same plane as a phrenologist" erted a profound effect on 20th-century (p. 27) and thus ushered in what is generally thought; an equally small minority would conregarded as the heyday of psychoanalytic sider its impact on the 21st century as assured.
ideas. However, the pervasiveness and intenThere have been numerous obituaries of psychodynamic thinking over the past decade sity of recent critiques cannot be shrugged off (Grünbaum, 1984; Webster, 1995) . Frederick even by the most committed Freudian zealots. Crews (1993) is perhaps representative. Before a psychodynamic approach to develCrews asserts that psychoanalytic theory is opmental psychopathology can move into the without significant experimental or epidemio-next century, it must deal with the challenges it faces and undertake radical reappraisal of its epistemic framework. It is argued herein that if such a reorientation is possible, the
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Critiques of the Psychodynamic Approach pression as we do so that we have a tool for understanding that not only makes sense to us The difficulties faced by psychodynamic but also works for our patients and is furtherthinking are both external and internal. Exter-more scientific.
nal challenges include poor evidence of treat-
There are several conditions that should be ment effectiveness; the building of develop-met for the accumulation of clinical observamental theory from retrospective accounts tions to become a genuinely adequate basis extrapolated from a clinical population; per-for psychoanalytic theory. These are: (a) a vasive gender, cultural, and ethnic biases; the clear logical tie between theory and techfailure to integrate data from the biological nique, so that the inevitable contamination of and social sciences; and a focus on the indi-observations by technique can be identified vidual to the exclusion of social and cultural and studied; (b) deductive as well as inducforces. As these external challenges are quite tive reasoning in relation to clinical material; well publicized (Frosh, 1997) , this review will (c) the unambiguous use of terms in labeling begin with the internal battles that need to be clinical observations; (d) a willingness to exaddressed if psychoanalysis is to remain influ-pose more clinical work to detailed scrutiny ential in the 21st century. and, therefore, to different theoretical perspectives; (e) reconsideration of the reconstructionist approach, since there are logical Internal problems pitfalls in building theory on the basis of reOver recent decades psychoanalysts have wit-membered events; and (f) good contact and nessed an increasing fragmentation of theory. collaboration between psychoanalysts and Arguably, the major psychoanalytic schools those working in neighboring disciplines. We that emerged following Freud's death, and think it is vital that psychoanalysis should not that have organized the discipline since (Fo-continue to insulate itself from related fields nagy, , are of work; there is much to be learned from breaking apart. This fragmentation, euphemis-both sides, as we strive to indicate. None of tically discussed as pluralism, could on its these criteria has yet been adequately met, and own spell the demise of psychoanalysis.
in the following sections we discuss some imWhy might this happen? Elsewhere (Fo-plications of this situation. nagy, in press) we have argued that a major problem with psychodynamic theory building Psychodynamic clinical practice is not lies in its relationship to clinical practice. Psylogically deducible from any psychoanalytic choanalysts have always argued, and we clinical theory agree, that psychoanalytic treatment provides a unique window on human behavior and ex-Psychoanalytic technique is not logically conperience, which generates developmentally nected to theory (e.g., see Berger, 1985) ; there rich and clinically powerful accounts. The are several aspects to this, some of which are main function of theory for practitioners is in touched on below. explaining clinical phenomena. The weakness of such clinical theories is their extensive reli-1. Psychoanalytic technique arose largely on ance on induction.
1 A theory is used as a the basis of trial and error, rather than havheuristic device rather than as a tool for deduction. The clinical usefulness and persua-2. In fact, most clinical laws are, in any case, only probasiveness of inductive arguments can lead us, bilistic (Ruben, 1993) . Therefore, they could allow with the greatest of ease, to raise the status of only inductive statistical explanations rather than de-"clinical theories" to laws, gaining the imductive-nomological ones (see Carl Hempel's 1965 Covering-Role Model). While we know that child maltreatment can give rise to behavioral disturbance, this is by no means inevitably the case (e.g., Cicchetti & 1. There is some truth to the quip that psychoanalytic clinicians understand the word data to be a plural of the Rogosch, 1997; Cicchetti, Rogosch, Lynch, & Hoot, 1993) . word anecdote.
ing been driven by theory. Freud (1912) not for the relative independence of theory and practice. willingly acknowledged this: "The technical rules which I am putting forward have been arrived at from my own experience in Inductive rather than deductive reasoning is the course of many years, after unfortunate used in relation to clinical material results had led me to abandon other methods" (p. 111).
The predominant theory-building strategy in clinical psychoanalysis is "enumerative in-2. There is no one-to-one correspondence be-ductivism" (the accumulation of instances tween differing psychoanalytic frameworks consistent with a premise). In treating a paand the techniques used. It is as easy to il-tient, we have access to a set of observations, lustrate how the same theory can generate certain of which are selected as telling. From different techniques as how the same tech-these the analyst draws conclusions about nique may be justified by different theories how the patient generally behaves and why he (Wallerstein, 1992) . For example, Gedo or she does so. The analyst will be predis- (1979) states that "principles of psychoana-posed to focus on those aspects of the palytic practice . . . [are] . . . based on rational tient's interaction which make sense in terms deductions from our most current concep-of existing theoretical constructs. Induction is tion of psychic functioning" (p. 16). His thus made not just from the accumulation of book claims that developmental problems observations about a particular individual but can be reversed "only by dealing with those also from formulations of past cases by other results of all antecedent developmental vi-psychoanalysts. cissitudes that later gave rise to maladaptaFrom a clinical point of view this is useful. tion" (p. 21). However, what sounds like a The difficulty arises from our understanding, deduction on closer examination turns out as clinicians, of the role of theory. We conto be a hypothesis. It is one thing to pre-sider it to lend credence to inductive observasume and quite another to demonstrate that tions because we assume that theories have therapy requires developmental vicissitudes been inferred from a very large number of obto be addressed sequentially. Many have servations and subsequently tested against powerfully challenged the overuse of the new, independent observations. What we can developmental metaphor (Mayes & Spence, find ourselves doing instead, however, is pil-1994) and, even from within the self-psy-ing induction on untested induction. chology orientation to which Gedo belongs, Thus, theory is intrinsically contaminated the support for his strong assertion is lim-by the technique used to generate observaited (Kohut, 1984, pp. 42-46) .
tions. Theory has been shaped by what has been found clinically helpful, rather than 3. Theory and practice have developed at very different rates, with practice changing only practice being dictated by what is true about the mind. Thus, while theory is a vital adjunct in minor ways during the 20th century, in contrast to the major strides made by theo-to clinical practice, neither has been used in a way that would have helped to validate the ries. It is quite realistic to contemplate a single volume account that would encom-other. We almost certainly miss many instances when the patient's reaction is not as pass most major technical advances, 3 yet no single person could do justice to all the we would have anticipated on the basis of a theoretical formulation, and we therefore do enormous theoretical developments that have taken place over the same period. The not use the disconfirmations to improve or discard psychoanalytic theories. Psychoanadiscrepancy in rates of change is staggering and would be hard to understand were it lysts are not alone with this problem. Not only most clinical thinking, but in fact all human reasoning shares this flaw (Johnson-Laird 1972).
To take a simplistic example, signs of un-challenge. Most of the concepts are private; many of them (e.g., "splits in the ego," masconscious anger-displaced onto the self and away from someone ambivalently loved and ochism, and omnipotence) are complex and abstract. However, while the clarification of now lost-are easily found in cases of depression, and Freud's description (1915) remains terms is laborious, it is possible (e.g., Sandler, 1962) . It is also essential if we are to find clinically compelling. But what of cases where we can see the inward direction of out where theoretical differences are real, and where they may only be imagined. anger, but it does not lead to depression? Such cases could have been used to test and extend the psychoanalytic theory of depression. To Allowing clinical observations to be ask clinicians (and this applies not only to shared and tested psychoanalysts) to note and act on such negative instances, however, seems to introduce Clinicians' narrative reports are necessarily selective. We cannot expect any participant in something alien to the therapeutic process, setting therapeutic and research aims against an interaction to be unbiased, to introduce no omissions and distortions. Far more important each other. Despite a few great exceptions such as Freud, this confirmatory bias may be than bias, however, is that interactions are largely governed by nonconscious mechafatal, in most cases, to the popular notion of clinician as researcher.
nisms, unavailable to introspection. There are quite dramatic illustrations of this-Krause's This logical difficulty in selecting between theories is the primary reason for their prolif-(1997) studies of facial expressions in face-toface psychotherapy, and Beebe's (1997) and eration. As clinical observations are used inductively by theorists who are themselves cli-Tronick's (1989) work on mother-infant interaction. The crucial information was never nicians, new psychodynamic theories readily emerge and obtain some confirmation. New consciously known to the participants, and could not have been reported, only observed. theories are seen as supplementing rather than replacing older ones (Sandler, 1983) , so that
There is a constant tension between making reliable, accessible observations and intronumerous partially incompatible formulations need to be combined to provide comprehen-ducing an unacceptable interference into the process. We must do everything possible to sive accounts. Thus, at any time psychoanalytic theory is like a growing family of ideas, gain informed consent, to protect confidentiality, and to ensure that observation creates with resemblances, relationships, and feuds. If a psychoanalytic approach is to survive, then minimal distortion. These are, however, not insuperable problems in other areas of psythere must be ways of pruning this family tree, so that the body of theory is strengthened chotherapy research and need not be so for psychoanalysis (Jones, 1993) . rather than continually branching out.
The ambiguous use of terms
The reconstructionist clinical stance Clinical theories of development are mainly Perhaps in order to accommodate proliferating ideas, the definition of theoretical terms based on the accounts of people who have sought help for symptoms or other life probhas been left vague (Sandler, 1983) . This is neither unusual nor easily avoided. It is the lems, and who attempt to recall events that occurred during early childhood, the most relway that human language and all human conceptual systems deal with the complexity of evant part of which covers the preverbal stages of development. There are two great the phenomena they represent (Rosch, 1978; Wittgenstein, 1969) . However, the absence of dangers here: firstly, of a logical fallacy in assuming that something must have gone operational definitions may obscure important differences between theoretical approaches. amiss during childhood, and, secondly, of an empirically discredited assumption that reThe definition of concepts in psychodynamic theories admittedly poses a formidable membered events are "true." (Psychoanalysis has contributed significantly to our knowl-disorder abhorrent to psychoanalysts (Ullmann & Krasner, 1969; Wolpe, 1969) . edge about sources of bias that can strongly distort early memories: see Brewin, AnPsychology has, of course, changed, and now leads the scientific study of mental prodrews, & Gotlib, 1993; Fonagy & Target, 1997.) cesses (Westen, 1999) . Some changes particularly relevant to psychoanalysis include the It should not, however, be too readily assumed that empirical data are necessarily development of (cognitive) therapeutic models in clinical psychology, which recognize more helpful than clinical data in the construction of a psychological theory. Westen the influence of nonconscious processes on emotional states; the harnessing of technology (1991) points to the relative paucity of rich theories within current psychiatry and psy-for the recording of interaction; and the development of methods for studying transgenerachology that are based on controlled studies. Indeed, many psychological theories and em-tional influences on personality development.
The current generation of psychoanalysts pirical investigations of psychopathology explicitly acknowledge their indebtedness to is returning to an appreciation of systematic observational and developmental studies. psychoanalytic ideas. Clinical data offer a fertile ground for theory building but not for dis-Such studies were begun by Freud (see Freud, 1909a Freud, , 1919 Freud, , 1920 and were continued by tinguishing good theories from bad or better ones. The convergence of evidence from sev-Anna Freud, René Spitz, Margaret Mahler, Esther Bick, Donald Winnicott, and others. eral sources (e.g., clinical, experimental, behavioral, epidemiological, and biological) will However, these studies fell out of favor with psychoanalysts when taken up by apparently provide the best tests of the claims of psychoanalysis (Fonagy, 1982) .
alien scientific disciplines. In the next century, we can expect that developmental studies will be increasingly recognized as allowPsychoanalysis has been too isolated from ing us to test psychoanalytic theories. For neighboring disciplines example, in the mid-20th century, Melanie Klein was roundly condemned for making exPsychoanalysts over the last 50 years have attempted to define their field independently of travagant claims for the capacities of infants, but recent observational evidence of their cogtwo major neighboring branches of scientific activity: (a) psychology and (b) neurobiology. nitive capacities has given some support to her ideas (Gergely, 1991) . We believe that this insular approach now needs to be challenged.
There is a further problem concerning psychological therapies. The pressure for cheaper and quicker treatments has prompted some Psychoanalysis and psychology. Progress in psychology has been largely ignored by psy-psychoanalysts to experiment with alternative methods-briefer, more focused therapies, choanalysts, despite the fact that an increasing proportion of psychoanalysts have received and special therapies for particular groups (e.g., Malan & Osimo, 1992) . The psychoanatheir basic training in clinical psychology. (Surveys of the profession demonstrate that lytic establishment, presumably concerned about superficiality, has on the whole ignored the proportion of psychologists among psychoanalytic trainees increased to 25% from a these experiments. The gap has rapidly been filled by alternative therapies, with often limnegligible percentage over the last decade: American Psychoanalytic Association, 1998.) ited observational or theoretical basis, borrowing increasingly heavily, and sometimes Historically, there were valid reasons for this. Until the 1960s psychology espoused a posi-openly, from psychoanalysis (e.g., Ryle, 1994) . Both the discoveries and the effects of tivist epistemology, was almost exclusively concerned with behavior and was highly an-cognitive behavioral and even behavior therapy are as easy to explain in terms of psychotagonistic to psychoanalysis (Eysenck, 1952) . As a result, clinical psychology embraced a analytic ideas as in terms of social learning theory (Fonagy, 1989) . It is regrettable that simplistic and mechanistic approach to mental more psychoanalysts have not tried to evolve have negated the reasons for this (Westen, in press-a). Neuroscientists are no longer connew psychotherapeutic techniques, rather than sticking to a "one size fits all" principle.
cerned just with cognitive disabilities or socalled organic disorders (Kandel, 1998 ; LeThis situation has altered somewhat, and the changes are very likely to accelerate. Doux, 1995a). If Freud were alive today, then he would have been greatly interested in new Many American institutes of psychoanalysis have started training psychotherapy candi-knowledge about brain functioning, such as the development of neural nets, and the locadates, only some of whom are expected to go on to full psychoanalytic training. Others have tion of specific capacities with functional PET scans, and he would surely not have abanaccepted directly the challenge of alternative therapies and are working towards either in-doned his cherished Project (Freud, 1895) to develop a neural model of behavior. Genetics tegrating effective components of these into psychoanalytically oriented treatments (Gold-has progressed, if anything, even more rapidly, and mechanisms which underpin and fried, 1995) or differentiating the effective elements of each (e.g., Jones, 1997) .
sustain a complex gene-environment interaction belie early assumptions about constitutional disabilities (Plomin, DeFries, McPsychoanalysis and neurobiology. With notable exceptions, psychoanalysts have disre-Learn, & . In fact, for the past 15-20 years the field of neuroscience has garded the relevance of neurobiology to psychoanalytic ideas. The rejection of biology been wide open for input from those with an adequate understanding of environmental dewas not arbitrary but reasoned-not political but conceptual. Psychoanalysts were power-terminants of development and adaptation.
Sadly, the response of psychoanalysts has fully influenced by Freud's failure to create a psychoanalytic neurobiology (Freud, 1895) been more defensive than welcoming of these remarkable advances. The anxiety appears to and opted for a purely mental model based around verbal reports of internal experience. be that hard-won psychoanalytic insights could be damaged rather than enriched by In the 1940s and 1950s neurobiology was dominated by mass action theory (Lashley, new methods of inquiry (Green, 1999) . However, there are encouraging signs that this is 1929), which held that the cortex was largely indivisible from a functional point of view changing; see, for instance, the excellent series of detailed papers on developments in and behavior could not be usefully studied from the point of view of the brain.
neuroscience published by the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis in the last few Neuroscientists were, by and large, unconcerned with mental health problems, their fo-years, and the establishment of new journals bridging psychoanalysis and neuroscience. cus being on deficits of cognitive functioning rather than affect regulation. Psychoanalysis began in radical opposition to a prevailing The Promise of Psychoanalysis view that mental disorders represented a constitutional irreversible vulnerability of the in-Given the limitations of psychoanalytic theory, an obvious question is why developdividual. An unhelpful distinction between so-called functional and organic disorders was mental psychopathology should concern itself with this flawed and apparently outdated apthen developed within psychiatry and other mental health professions, which (although proach. We intend here to examine first whether psychoanalysis is compatible with rarely scrutinized from this point of view) implied mind-body dualism, again something new knowledge emerging from genetics and other related fields, and whether its discoverFreud had rejected.
While-in terms of developing the disci-ies could be integrated with the progress being made elsewhere. Only if it is does it seem pline with its focus on unconscious determinants-it may have been helpful to isolate worth considering whether psychoanalysis has additional features which entitle it to exert psychoanalysis from the brain sciences, in the last 30 years advances in all the neurosciences an influence in the coming decades.
The challenge of genetics
2. The notion of nonshared environment includes two components: firstly, the extent Over the last decade, research in genetics apto which key parameters within a shared peared to have all but eliminated the place for environment may differ in relation to a spea psychoanalytic account and refuted all theocific child, and, secondly, the extent to ries that advocated the key role of early famwhich shared environments may be experiily experience (see Scarr, 1992) . There has enced differently by two children. Neither been a claim that environmentally mediated of these pathways necessarily involves gefamily influences were inherited and therefore netic mediation. in themselves unimportant (Rowe, 1994 ) and 3. Neither twin studies nor adoption studies that insofar as family environment mattered, can provide firm indications of the relative it was specific to each child, even within the importance of genes and environment. same family (Plomin & Daniels, 1987) . It has They provide estimates of individual differalso been suggested that influences, preence within a population. For example, viously considered environmental, were actuwhile height is clearly heritable, changes in ally genetically mediated (Kendler et al., average height over the past 100 years (in 1996) and, further, that some genetically inexcess of 1 ft for males) reveal that much fluenced aspects of children's behavior may of the variability must be attributable to the have been responsible for provoking observed environment. Secular trends over the past negative responses in parents and other people 50 years reveal a substantial increase in the (O'Connor, Deater-Deckard, Fulker, Rutprevalence of a number of childhood menter, & Plomin, 1998) . Finally, all estimates for tal disorders (e.g., antisocial disorder, suithe heritability of psychiatric disorders incidal behavior, depressive disorder, and crease when lifetime risk, rather than point misuse of drugs; see Rutter & Smith, prevalence, is used as an index variable 1995). Twin studies, where children's ages (Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves, are identical, cannot reflect the critical en-1993). All in all, a cultural shift characterizes vironmental influences implicit in such secthe last decade of this century, with both proular trends. fessionals and the lay public switching from a primarily psychosocial model of child and 4. Heritability estimates are dependent on the adult disturbance to a genetic-biological samples studied. Samples are mostly biased frame of reference that a priori excluded conand exclude environments that are most sideration of psychodynamic aspects.
likely to be associated with deviations of A more balanced view of these genetic personality development. Gene-environdata was advanced by Michael Rutter and colment correlations imply that discrepancies leagues , and this has reesbetween the environments of twins are tablished the potential for psychoanalytic aclikely, in any case, to be relatively small. counts. The main features of this view are Cultural factors are also mostly partialed out: if individuals from a variety of cultures outlined below.
were to be included in the same study, our estimates of the likely impact of shared en-1. Virtually all forms of psychopathology invironment on personality would be very volve both gene-environment correlations different (Mandler, 1997) . and interactions. However, these correlations do not necessarily imply an etiologi-5. Genetic effects may well be indirect as well cal role for genetics. Individuals affect the as direct. Even a high genetic loading for a environment and some gene-environment certain environmental hazard does not covariance may be due to person charactermean that the consequences associated with istics, irrespective of whether these person that risk factor would necessarily be geneticharacteristics are genetic or environmental cally rather than environmentally mediated. For example, if child abuse were found to in origin (O'Connor et al., 1998) .
have a large genetic component, its toxic turn be a function of either genetic or environmental influences, or their interaction (Kaneffects would still be via the destruction of trust in the abused child rather than via a del, 1998). Thus intrapsychic representational processes are not just consequences of envipurely genetic process.
ronmental and genetic effects-they may be 6. Studies that attempt to exclude direct and critical moderators. This has substantial cliniindirect genetic effects still reflect the con-cal significance, since the understanding of an siderable influence of early experience. For environment by the child is more readily example, a study of adult female twins modifiable than the environment itself, or the demonstrated that a history of parental loss genes with which the environment interacts through separation, though not through (Emde, 1988) . A psychodynamic, intrapsydeath, was associated with adult vulnerabil-chic perspective may be helpful in considerity to depression and alcoholism (Kendler ing , 1996) . A recent well-controlled pro-also which processes influence the course of spective study showed that childhood mal-the disorder for better or worse. treatment was associated with a 9-fold increase in the risk of personality disorders of Unconscious intentionality a dramatic type (Johnson, Cohen, Brown, Smailes, & Bernstein, 1999) .
The hallmark of psychoanalytic theory is the attention to unconscious mental processes and We believe that in general the challenge of unconscious motivation in the explanation of genetics over the last decade has been a help-complex and often paradoxical human behavful one for the psychodynamic approach. It ior. We suggest that knowledge concerning has served to balance the naive environmen-unconscious mental processes and motivatalism of the second half of this century, tions could be integrated into the emerging which culminated, for example, in the over-science of the mind, to which developmental diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder psychopathology remains a key contributor. among victims of childhood maltreatment and As some philosophers have relatively recently gave rise to the unfortunate debate on false concluded, Freud's brilliant insights may be memories of abuse (Sandler & Fonagy, 1997) . seen as extensions of common sense or folk Psychodynamic theory, which is inherently psychology (Churchland, Ramachandran, & person centered, has much to contribute to the Sejnowski, 1994) to unconscious mental funcintegration of genetics into developmental sci-tioning (Hopkins, 1992) . ence. The primary concern of psychoanalysis Cognitive neuroscience has shown that is with the interaction of multiple layers of most of the work of the brain is nonconscious representations in generating developmental (Kihlstrom, 1987) . This is now known to inoutcomes (e.g., id, ego and superego, part and clude not only memory acquired implicitly whole object representations). Data from ge-(without conscious awareness; e.g., see Milnetics call for exactly such sophistication in ner, Squire, & Kandel, 1998) but also implicit understanding the way genes may or may not aspects of thought, decision making, problem be expressed in particular individuals. For ex-solving, and other cognitive tasks (e.g., Unample, while risk factors operate in combina-derwood, 1996). Freud (1900) , having recogtion, there is substantial individual variability nized the importance of this fact in the develin response to stress and adversity. Much of opment of psychopathology, advanced two this variability is poorly understood (Rutter, radical propositions which go beyond the cur-1999), but it underscores the potential impor-rent position of neuroscientists. First, mental tance of intrapsychic variables. Whether or health problems could be understood in terms not the specific environmental factors trigger of unconsciously held mental states (beliefs the expression of a gene may depend not only and desires; Freud & Breuer, 1895) . Second, on the nature of those factors but also on the effective treatment of mental health problems could be undertaken if (and only if) the indiway the child experiences them. This may in vidual suffering from mental disorder was models was wrong. We happen to believe that both destructive envy and conflicting wishes made aware of these unconscious, and by definition maladaptive, beliefs or desires (e.g. for separateness and union are important ideas for understanding mental distress. The probFreud, 1909b).
Freud's arguments for moving the study of lem is one of trying to claim exclusivity for any of these ideas. Here we are not pleading mental disorder and its treatment to the level of psychological causation were sound and re-for an integrationist model (Goldfried & Newman, 1992) . Rather, we are suggesting that main broadly consistent with research evidence (see below). Unfortunately, he over-Freud's original rich elaboration led later psychoanalysts to conflate the framework of psyspecified his model and moved beyond general statements on the role of unconscious chological mechanisms implied by the theory with the specific mental contents that he used belief and desire and attempted to specify ideas that, in his view, commonly created un-to populate his intellectual framework. Unconscious conflict is core theory. Envy, conscious conflicts and led to problems of adaptation (e.g., unconscious conflicts concern-oedipal rivalry, separation-individuation conflicts, and narcissistic traumata are elaboraing toilet training; see Freud, 1905) . In a developmental context, Anna Freud (1974) tions at a different level-one of clinical observation-and are therefore too confounded went further and linked types of childhood mental health problems and categories of un-with practice to permit deductive inferences to developmental psychopathology. conscious conflict. For example, she was persuaded by clinical experience that childhood
Where the psychoanalytic position remains unique is in suggesting that motivational and phobias were associated with unresolved oedipal conflicts and that obsessive-compulsive affective processes that influence developmental processes may be unconscious. It is neurosis was related to the child's unconscious conflicts around early potty training.
puzzling that this should be so since the role of cognition in emotion and motivation is well Such overspecification of a good theory had to be counterproductive. The range of established (Mandler, 1997) , and, therefore, almost by definition, affect and motivation psychosocial experiences that reach a common symptomatic end point is probably limit-should be part of the "cognitive unconscious" (Kihlstrom, 1987) . Neurological evidence has less (i.e., equifinality; see Cicchetti & Rogosch, 1996) . Similarly, the same experience been accumulating to suggest that neural pathways for emotion entail two sets of structures. may well lead to a variety of clinical manifestations (e.g., Fergusson & Lynskey, 1996) . One is via the thalamus to the amygdala (which conveys primitive perceptual informaUnfortunately, in overspecifying his theory, Freud laid psychoanalysis open to endless re-tion with affective valence but without the involvement of consciousness), and the other visions and updating of aspects of theory which were never core to his ideas (Fonagy et involves the activation of cortical centers and deeper information processing prior to the acal., 1995). For example, the influential child analyst Melanie Klein was struck by the ap-tivation of the amygdala (LeDoux, 1995b) .
Patients with a variety of lesions who lose the parent destructiveness and cruelty manifested by normal infants (Klein, Heimann, Issacs, & capacity for conscious discrimination may retain the capacity to respond differentially at Riviere, 1946) . She attributed highly complex ideas (envy, paranoia, guilt, and the capacity the emotional level (e.g., Bechara et al., 1995) . There is evidence from nonneurologifor denial) to babies under 1 year of age, and saw these as central to later pathology. Oth-cal patients for unconscious affective preferences using low signal-to-noise ratio stimuli ers, focused on somewhat later developmental periods (e.g., Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, (e.g., Murphy, Monahan, & Zajonc, 1995) .
Conditioned emotional responses may be elic-1975), specified key conflicts quite differently (in this case, symbiosis, separation-individua-ited and even acquired (Wong, Bernat, Bunce, & Shevrin, in press ) outside of awaretion, etc.).
We are not suggesting that either of these ness. Unconscious attitudes, particularly ra-cial prejudice, have been persuasively shown ies have demonstrated that when people act on motives or preferences to which they have to influence not only the speed of information processing but also the reactions generated in no access, they will find reasons for having done this which are both incorrect (Nisbett & independent observers (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995) . Wilson, 1977) and likely to interfere with subsequent task performance (Wilson & These and other findings, recently comprehensively summarized by Westen (in press-b) , Schooler, 1991) .
The value of the concept of unconscious support the view that emotional processing occurs unconsciously in an automatic way. affect as motivation is strongest in explanations of psychological disturbance. PsychoanPreliminary data also support the view that the unconscious processing of emotional in-alytic theorists assume that development, both adaptive and maladaptive, is best understood formation may be qualitatively different from its conscious processing, in terms of the neu-in terms of the "competition, collaboration and conflict among quasi-independent psyral mechanisms involved (Morris, Ohman, & Dolan, 1998) , its psychophysiological con-chological events" occurring outside awareness (Westen, in press-a) . Westen makes a comitants (Dozier & Kobak, 1992) , and its behavioral consequences (Greenwald & Ba-strong case that the psychodynamic model is in line with contemporary connectionist or naji, 1995). To the extent that unconscious as well as conscious factors have a role to play, parallel distributed processing (PDP) models in cognitive science (Rumelhart & McClelthen abnormalities in unconscious functioning, as postulated by psychoanalysis, will re-land, 1986). Both psychodynamic and PDP models postulate multiple independent promain highly significant. Developmental psychopathology will need to integrate this cessing units that work alongside each other, at times in conflict, at times in collaboration, perspective on maladaptation.
to generate both conscious and unconscious decisions. Within the PDP model, conflict is Unconscious motivation an "emergent property" of the human nervous system. The constraints placed upon the sysOf course, admitting that affects may not be conscious is not equivalent to stating that un-tem are both external (context dependent) and internal (emotional and motivational). It folconscious mental states motivate behavior. Although unconscious motivation is not gen-lows from the independence of neural circuitry underlying the generation of individual erally considered by developmental psychopathologists, aside from those with preexisting mental states (beliefs, desires, fears, values) that these states may be opposed to one anpsychoanalytic leanings, it is neither an extravagant assumption nor one unsupported by other. It further follows from developmental localizationist perspectives consistent with other sources of data. Westen (in press-b) pointed out that the assumption that human PDP (Kinsbourne & Hicks, 1979; Schore, 1999) that several neural processing nets behavior is simultaneously motivated by multiple goals implies that the logical mechanism emerge early and simultaneously in development to perform the same psychological funcfor organizing these must exclude consciousness, because of the excessive demands these tion. This ensures plasticity and protects the organism from the consequences of brain inwould make on working memory.
There is considerable evidence consistent jury. In the course of development and the inwith this view. For example, intending to carry out an action will lead to heightened ac-creasing involvement of specific brain locations with specific tasks, connections between tivation of the information to be remembered even when the intention is no longer con-some of these nets and processing units on the periphery of the evolving system (at greater scious, as evidenced by response latencies for recognizing to-be-remembered items from a cortical distance from the point of localization) will be increasingly marginalized (Edellist (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) . A range of stud-man, 1992). As feedback to such systems is Early childhood experience degraded by cortical distance, the processing Of greatest direct relevance to developmental characteristics of these vestigial systems will psychopathology is the role of early childhood not be updated in line with neural nets that experience in determining adult personality. are closer to the focal area responsible for This has been a key tenet of all psychoanaspecific tasks. These vestigial nets will therelytic propositions. The issue has been hotly fore remain archaic in their functioning. Thus debated within psychology . conflict between the output of central and peReviews in the 1980s concluded that there ripheral processing units, with processing were few serious long-term sequelae of adcharacteristics reflecting varying levels of maverse childhood experiences that were clearly turity, may be inevitable.
independent of later adversities (Rutter, Consistent with the notion of relative inde-1981). Later research, however, demonstrated pendence of neural circuitry for a variety of that early experiences did exert long-term efemotional and motivational states is the accufects (Sroufe, Egeland, & Kreutzer, 1990 ), but mulating body of knowledge concerning the these stemmed from (a) their contribution to neural circuitry responsible for positive and the generation of further negative experiences negative affect states (Davidson, 1992; Gray, (Sroufe & Fleeson, 1988) and (b) & Sroufe, 1992) . Psychodynamic thedevelopment of cognitive-emotional strucory might suggest that individuals with early tures that resolve incompatibilities in emoadversity process their experiences differently tional information processing represents a key and proactively create experiences compatible developmental goal. For example, in the sowith past interactions (e.g., Caspi & Moffitt, cial referencing task, 12-month-olds respond 1995). There is evidence that individuals who with distress and confusion if they receive have encountered early adversity are more conflicting facial messages from their two likely to encounter both acute and chronic parents (Hirshberg & Svejda, 1990) . The failpsychosocial adversities in adult life (e.g., ure to resolve conflict in relation to the anticiChampion, Goodall, & Rutter, 1995) . pated behavior of the attachment figure is a An alternative model of the relationship of key part of models of disorganized attachment early experience and a predisposition to psy-(Lyons-Ruth & Jacobovitz, 1999; Main & chopathology, fully consistent with Freud's Morgan, 1996) . Psychoanalytic models of ideas (Freud, 1915) , has emerged from the bipsychopathology mostly entail the notion of ological literature. Early stress (separation compromise formation (Brenner, 1982) . Neofrom its mother) in the life of a rodent pup Piagetian developmental theory (Fischer & led to enduring neuroendocrine abnormalities, Ayoub, 1994) also assumes that development whereas appropriate caregiving responses to is a stepwise integration of independently the pup's distress led to a reduction in the evolving cognitive capacities.
pup's hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) Thus, both neuropsychological and develresponse for the rest of the animal's life (Leopmental models are consistent with psychovine, Haltmeyer, Kaas, & Penenberg, 1967) . analytic ideas concerning the coexistence of Intervening research has demonstrated that reprocessing units from different developmental sponsive caregiving serves, in the long term, stages, the ubiquity of conflict between them, to reduce the pup's fearfulness and vulnerabiland the desirability of adaptive resolution of ity to stress-related disease (Liu et al., 1997; these conflicts as part of the developmental Plotsky & Meaney, 1993) . Other studies have process. Psychoanalytic theories of conflict demonstrated that early adverse life experimay have much to contribute to the study of development in the coming years.
ences in rats are associated with profound and persistent increases in gene expression for with other measures is most marked (Westen, 1991) , is the emphasis on mental representacorticotrophin releasing factor (CRF), not only in the hypothalamus but also in limbic tions of relationships as mediators of selforganization and as determinants of the imareas (Nemeroff, 1996; Plotsky & Meaney, 1993) . Independently, it has been demon-pact of the environment on the individual.
These representational structures are thought strated that increased secretion of glucocorticoids over a prolonged period can lead to per-to mediate the experience of abnormal development. The concept emerged originally in manent damage to hippocampal neurons (McEwen & Sapolsky, 1995) . These data pro-the context of object relations theory, which has developed rapidly over the past 50 years vide an underpinning for the traditional psychoanalytic emphasis on the lifelong impact . Numerous research methods have emerged to explore psychodyof very early attachment experiences.
Whether early environmental risk is car-namic aspects of the child's representational world (e.g., Macfie et al., 1999; Oppenheim, ried forward primarily by the predisposition to select adverse environments (Farrington, Emde, & Warren, 1997; Toth, Cicchetti, Macfie, & Emde, 1997) . There is accumulating Barnes, & Lambert, 1996; Quinton & Rutter, 1988) , by maladaptive affect regulation, by evidence to suggest that children transform early interactions with primary caregivers into neuroendocrine abnormalities, or by some combination of the three is not yet clear. cognitive-affective schemas of self and other, which regulate and direct subsequent behavior However, all these models are consistent with psychoanalytical ideas (Kandel, 1999) . In fact (Bretherton & Munholland, 1999) . These schemata not only bear the imprint of signifithe psychological mechanisms implied may be the same regardless of the level of analysis cant interactions but also express the developmental level which dominates the individual's (social or biological): such mechanisms might include unconscious biases in the processing functioning (Westen, 1990) . According to psychoanalytic theory, beyond representing of information, the absence of a capacity to plan (Quinton, Pickles, Maughan, & Rutter, consensual reality, internal working models contain the unique constructions of each 1993), or distorted models of relationship representation (Fonagy et al., 1996) . There is ac-child. Representations are distorted by defenses (Newman, Duff, & Baumeister, 1997 ) cumulating evidence that prolonged early and severe privation, particularly the absence of and impulses (Westen, Muderrisoglu, Fowler, Shedler, & Koren, 1997) . These may be indian attachment relationship, may have irreversible effects (O'Connor, Rutter, & Kreppner, cations of a genetic predisposition or prior environmental experience. In either case, the in press). A counterpoint to these observations is other evidence of the possibility of child's distortion of the external world represents a significant challenge to studies aiming change-so called "turning point effects" (Caspi & Moffitt, 1993) . Psychotherapy to find direct relationships between psychosocial adversity and psychopathology. Psychowould not be a viable option were it not for evidence that "experiences in adult life make analytic object relations theory, with its focus on idiosyncratic distortions, may be able to a decisive difference to people who have been placed at risk as a result of adverse experi-make a significant contribution.
For example, Blatt and Blass (1996) have ences in childhood" (Rutter, 1999, p. 487) . The psychoanalytic focus on early experience proposed that a dialectic between two developmental pressures defines the evolving rephas been demonstrated to be appropriate by research, and its depth-psychological perspec-resentations of self-other relationships: the needs for (a) a sense of relatedness and (b) a tive may illuminate outstanding questions.
sense of autonomous identity. These developMental representations and object mental processes are thought to be in synerrelationships gistic interaction throughout development and a lack of balance implies psychopathology. A key aspect of the psychoanalytic model of the mind, and the one where convergence "Anaclitic pathology" (an exaggerated need for relatedness) is present in dependent, histri-Psychoanalytic orientation, regardless of specific model, perhaps equips clinicians to hanonic, or borderline personality disorder; "introjective pathology" (an exaggerated quest dle and make sense of particularly intense and potentially disturbing human encounters. It is for identity) is thought to characterize schizoid, schizotypal, narcissistic, antisocial, or possible that the human understanding they offer is more complex and psychologically avoidant individuals.
This person-centered approach deepens our deeper than other so-called omnibus theories of human behavior (cognitive-behavioral, huunderstanding of psychiatric disturbance, as categorized by DSM-IV, from a develop-manistic, systemic), even if psychoanalysis is therapeutically no more effective than these mental standpoint. For example, Blatt and Bers (1993) differentiate two types of depres-other approaches. Interpersonal interactions are complex, rapid, and beyond the capacities sion: a dependent (anaclitic) and a self-critical (introjective) type. Thus depression in indi-of the conscious mind to monitor or effectively guide beyond certain rudimentary stratviduals with borderline personality disorder is characterized by emptiness, loneliness, des-egies.
The work of Krause (1997) on the facial peration vis-à-vis attachment figures, and labile, diffuse affectivity. For nonborderline in-expression of affect in psychotherapy, for example, demonstrated that the success of dividuals with major depression, these aspects correlate negatively with the severity of de-psychotherapy was indexed by a subliminal affective interplay between therapist and papression, whereas for borderline individuals the same symptoms correlate almost perfectly tient. Congruent responses by the therapist (the therapist's tendency to match the pawith severity within the limits of the reliability of measurement (Rogers, Widiger, & tient's affect) was consistently associated with poor outcome. Complementary affective reKrupp, 1995; Westen et al., 1992) . Response to treatment is powerfully predicted by this sponses (the therapist tends to manifest an affect consistent with the patient's words but indistinction. For example, in the NIMH trial (Blatt, Zuroff, Bondi, Sanislow, & Pilkonis, consistent with their facial display) predicted good outcome. The association with outcome 1998; Elkin, 1994) , individuals with perfectionism (introjective type) were unlikely to held for cognitive behavior therapy as strongly as for psychodynamic treatment. improve after the first few sessions, whereas patients with a high need for approval (ana-Therapists are only aware of these split-second interchanges in terms of general subjecclitic types) improved significantly in the second half of the treatment (Blatt, Quinlan, Pil-tive impressions. Allowing such intuitions to guide the therapeutic process is both the most konis, & Shea, 1995). The value of the psychoanalytic approach is highlighted by the cherished preserve and the greatest burden of the psychodynamic approach to treatment. fact that the majority of studies of depression neither explores nor differentiates between The exploration of the limits of interpersonal awareness in the context of therapy may be these groups, although the experience of psychological distress in the two groups is criti-the inherent appeal of psychoanalytic developmental ideas for clinicians, and may be part cally different. A person-centered approach that takes the representational world as its fo-of the explanation for the continued popularity of an approach which is so vulnerable cus is helpful in refining our predictions.
to criticisms on epistemic and empirical grounds. The tapping and matching of the Close ties to interpersonal reality sensitivity of the human mind as an instrument for the scientific study of development As psychoanalytic theory is rooted in clinical practice, the experience of the therapist pro-remains a challenge for the next century. vides a valuable vehicle for creating under-
The unique appeal of psychoanalysis standing of thoughts, feelings, and behavior that lie beyond the normal range of conscious To acknowledge the limitations of psychoanalytic epistemology is to tell but one half of a experience and common sense psychology. remarkable story. Some of the greatest minds comprehensive picture of human psychological growth. ever to become interested in the subject of psychology, in particular the psychology of mental disorders, have adopted the frame Conclusions of reference of psychoanalysis. We believe they did so not because they were drawn to Psychoanalytic ideas remain radical and retain an epistemology that was too loose to be able the potential to illuminate many aspects of deto reject new ideas but rather because psycho-velopmental psychopathology. Some major analysis offered the richest and subtlest set of tasks for psychoanalytically oriented clinielements for describing the mind.
cian-researchers are A number of its characteristics suggest that there is something important in this approach. (a) to move away from enumerative inductivFirst, there is a great deal of generativity ism and develop closer links with the alterwithin the field. Psychoanalytic ideas have innative data gathering methods available in spired major psychological theories as well as modern social and biological science; important lines of empirical investigation (b) to define psychoanalytic constructs and (learned helplessness theory, schema theory, techniques more tightly. This must include attachment theory, aggression and hostility as not only operational definitions but also a cause of psychosomatic conditions, selfthe "unpacking" of overarching concepts, serving cognitive distortions-termed defense such as object relationships, and the specimechanisms by psychoanalysts-etc.). Secfication of predictions: what remote or ond, psychoanalytic theories frequently offer proximal variables account for the emerattractive unifying explanations of diverse gence of specific symptoms, and what is overt behavior by postulating a single underthe interaction among predisposing varilying covert anomaly. For example, why are ables and other contributory factors? narcissistic individuals often forgetful of names, prejudiced, inconsiderate of others' (c) to develop a tradition of "comparative time, and unable to remain in love? Psychoanpsychoanalytic studies," where alternative alytic accounts, whether self-psychological or frameworks are considered side by side in based on other object relations views, attempt relation to the observations. This should be to find a single explanation for such diverse extended so that explanations from outside phenomena. Third, the psychoanalytic develpsychoanalysis are considered, because opmental approach is dynamic, seeing develthey may suggest better or complementary opment as a series of compromise formations.
ways of understanding the data. This gives depth, texture, and complexity to (d) related to the above, to become more sothe developmental process, which-as we phisticated in thinking about interactions have tried to illustrate-is in line with new between the intrapsychic world and the enknowledge emerging from both neuroscience vironment (Rutter, 1993) and the proand developmental psychopathology. Many cesses of risk and trauma; psychoanalytic accounts provide satisfying functionalist explanations of observed pat-(e) to give much greater consideration to the terns of behavior and the observed characterwider social and cultural context within istics of mental representation. These charwhich object relations develop. For examacteristics have supported developmental ple, placing the individuated self at the psychopathology over the last quarter of a peak of a developmental hierarchy is ethcentury and will, we trust, continue to do so nocentric, as well as pathologizing a mode in the next.
of functioning that may be adaptive in cerWe have striven to show that, beyond gentain contexts. eral characteristics, some specific insights of psychoanalysis should be preserved if devel-(f) to focus on the relevance of psychoanalytic theory and treatment to the commuopmental psychopathology is to retain its nity at large. For example, psychoanalytic more seriously could have a very beneficial effect on epistemological and methodological studies of multigenerational traumata have principally focused on survivors of the aspects of developmental psychopathology.
This particularly applies to the central notion Holocaust (e.g., Kogan, 1995) . Yet perthat complex and, at times, conflicting reprehaps we could learn as much or more sentations of unconscious beliefs and affects about this process from the study of Africreated early in life influence behavior and can American communities in the United experience throughout the lifetime. A widenStates, many of whose current problems ing perspective could, for example, lead to a could be seen in the context of our failures shift in emphasis from self-report to narrative in terms of their history in North America data; to a closer examination of patterns of as an enslaved group (e.g., Bass, Wyatt, & narration, as opposed to observations of narraPowell, 1982); tive content; to a greater concern with dis-(g) to throw away the shackles of an over-cordance and conflict among response sysspecified theory and focus on the essential tems, rather than a single-minded search for components of psychoanalytic psychologi-congruence and consistency. Psychoanalytic cal propositions. theory is alive, and its potential for enriching our understanding of developmental psychoIf psychoanalysis is able to meet these pathology has not been fully exploited in the century that has just closed. challenges, then taking psychoanalytic ideas
